Based on an article published in the media, the applicant believed that his personal information had been unlawfully obtained and disclosed, and that he had been subjected to unlawful surveillance. The article claimed that Manuel and his wife (Ramos) had been subject to unlawful surveillance, and that their personal details, including particulars of their travel arrangements, had been collected and disclosed to the respondents.
At the centre of the present dispute was a book containing an exchange of letters between two brothers (“Van wyk Louw” and “WEG Louw”) who had a significant impact on the philosophical intellectual and literary heritage of Afrikaners.
In 2014, the applicant (“Hudaco”) acquired the Partquip business which conducted business in the aftermarket replacement automotive parts industry and was housed in a separate division within Hudaco. The first respondent (“Apex”) was a new competitor in the market and also supplied aftermarket replacement parts to motor vehicles and industrial bearings.
At the centre of the present appeal was the question of whether two claims in the patent in suit were invalid for lack of an inventive step. In particular, the question was whether it was inventive to mount a known radar system used to monitor slope system stability in open cast mines on a motorised automobile vehicle. It was common cause that the same radar system was previously mounted on a trailer that was hitched to a motorised automobile vehicle.
Trading under the name “Chicken Licken”, the applicant (“Golden”) operated some 200 outlets across the country. Part of the branding used in the business, were the words “Soul” and “Soul Food”, which Golden had registered as trade marks in terms of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. The first respondent had been selling souvlaki, a type of Greek street food, under the name “Soul Souvlaki” since November 2012. At the time of the hearing, he had two restaurants and also sold food at events and provided catering. The second respondent was registered in 2016 and was currently the proprietor of the restaurants.
An application by the applicant to prevent what it alleged was infringement of its trade mark by the respondent, was dismissed. The court also dismissed the respondent’s application to expunge the applicant’s trade marks. Both parties now sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of their respective applications. Held that the court was not satisfied that there was a reasonable possibility that another court would arrive at a different conclusion. Leave to appeal was thus dismissed.
The third appellant ("SABMA") was an association of manufacturers in the lead acid battery manufacturing industry. The first two appellants were respectively the association's chairman and secretary. The first respondent ("SABIA") was an association aimed at examining legislative or policy proposals likely to affect battery importers in South Africa, and engaging with legislative or regulatory authorities to further the interest of the association and its members.
The plaintiff was the curator ad litem of a minor. She instituted action against the defendants, jointly and severally, for damages for loss of support arising from the death by shooting of the minor’s mother. On the basis that the second to fifth defendants were members of the South African Police at the relevant time and had been acting within the course and scope of their employment, the defendants filed a first special plea that the claim had "prescribed" in terms of section 32 of the Police Act 7 of 1958.
The first applicant (“Discovery”) was the sole shareholder of the second and third applicants (respectively “Discovery Life” and “Discovery Vitality”). Discovery owned two trademarks, namely Discovery and Vitality – registered in relation to insurance services, among others. Discovery permitted Discovery Life and Discovery Vitality to use the trademarks under section 38 of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. Discovery Vitality’s primary business comprised the Vitality wellness and rewards programme (the Vitality programme), which it administered.
In September 2017, the Competition Commission referred a complaint to the Tribunal against the respondents (“Beefcor” and “Cape Fruit”) whom it accused of having been engaged in a prohibited practice under section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. The Commission alleged that the respondents had agreed not to compete in the market for processing wet peels and citrus peel pulp used in the production of livestock feed.